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I. INTRODUCTION

Salman Rushdie, the famous novelist, wrote in "Shalimar the Clown":
"Why not just stand still and draw a circle round your feet and name that
Selfistan?"' Any legal analysis of a group's right to secede from its mother
state involves a determination of whether the group is randomly-and thus
illegitimately--drawing a circle around its claimed territory and calling it a
"Selfistan," or whether the group has a legitimate claim to a defined
territory at the expense of the mother state's borders and territorial integrity.
International law has been inadequate in addressing the legality of
secessionist claims. While it recognizes the right of colonial peoples to
self-determination, as well as any state's right to the respect of its territorial
integrity, international law is silent on the issue of whether a non-colonized
minority group ever accrues the positive right to remedially secede from its
mother state.2
*

The Charles R. Emrick Jr.-Calfee Halter & Griswold Professor of Law and Associate

Dean for Academic Enrichment, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. The author would like to thank
organizers of International Law Weekend 2014 for the opportunity to present these remarks, as well as
fellow panelists: Professors Valerie Epps, Lea Brilmayer, Brad Roth, and John Cerone. The author
would also like to thank Elisabeth Leonard for her invaluable research assistance, as well as the
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law for its continuous research support.
1.

SALMAN RusHmm, SHALIMAR THE CLOWN 102 (Random House 2005).

2.
The United Nations Charter espouses the right of peoples to self-determination, as well as
the states' right to territorial integrity. Specifically, it enumerates as one of the purposes of the United
Nations, "To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples." U.N. Charter art. 1,para. 2 (emphasis added) (this portion of the
Charter has been interpreted to apply in the colonial context: that only colonized peoples would have
the right to self-determination). U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 announces that Member States "shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state." See MILENA STERIO, TI-E RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (Routledge 2013) (noting that World War II, the right to self-determination did
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This Article will argue toward the necessity to develop a new
international law framework on secession. The development of such a
normative framework is necessary in order to address various secessionist
situations around the globe, and to replace the resolution of secessionist
struggles through politics of the Great Powers with true legal norms.3
This Article will first analyze several examples of successful and
failed secessions in recent history. Then, it will focus on existing
international law on the subject-matter of secession, and will conclude that
existing norms are insufficient and indefinite. Finally, it will develop a new
proposed framework on secession, which attempts to adequately reconcile
the mother state's right to the respect of its territorial integrity with the
secessionist entity's claim for independence.
II. EXAMPLES OF SECESsIoNs THROUGHOUT HISTORY
Examples of successful secessions in recent history include the
Kosovar secession from Serbia, the South Sudanese secession from Sudan,
and the Crimean secession from Ukraine. 4 More remote successful
secessions include the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1993, and
Bangladesh from Pakistan, in 1971.'
Examples of unsuccessful or
not necessarily extend to the non-decolonization paradigm). Compare Diane Orenlichter, International
Responses to Separate Claims Are Democratic Principles Relevant?, in SECESSION AND SELFDETERMINATION 19, 38-39 (Stephen Macedo and Allen Buchanan eds., 2003) ("Emerging norms
recognizing a right to self-government lend support to separatist claims principally when those same
norms have already been profoundly, irremovably breached.") with James Crawford, State Practiceand
InternationalLaw in Relation to Secession, BRIT. Y.B. of INT'L L "114 (Clarendon Press 1999) ("State
practice since 1945 shows very clearly the extreme reluctance of States to recognize or accept unilateral
secession outside the colonial context.").
3.
See STERIO, supra note 2, at 44-45. The term "Great Powers" refers to the most powerful
states economically, militarily, and politically, such as veto-holding members of the United Nations
Security Council (United States, United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia), and other economic
powerhouses such as Germany, Italy, and Japan.
4.
See generally. Christopger J. Borgen, Is Kosovos a Precedent? Secession, SelfDetermination and Conflict Resolution, WILSON CENTER (June 13, 2008), available at
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/350-kosovo-precedent-secession-self-determination-andconflict-resolution# (last visited Jan. 23, 2015); Jeffrey Gettleman, After Years of Struggle, South Sudan
Becomes
a
New
Nation,
N.Y.
TIMEs
(July
9,
2011),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/10/world/africa/l0sudan.html?pagewanted=print (last visited Jan. 23,
2015); David M. Herszenhom, Crimea Votes to Secede From Ukraine as Russian Troops Keep Watch,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/17/ world/europe/crimeaukraine-secession-vote-referendum.html? r-0 (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
5.
See Bereket H. Selassie, Comment, Self-Determination in Principle and Practice: The
Ethiopian-EritreanExperience, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 91 (1997) (this Article will briefly
discuss the first three more recent secessions, but will not focus on the latter two remote secessions).
See RICHARD SISSON & LEO E. ROSE, WAR AND SECESSION PAKISTAN, INDIA, AND THE CREATION OF
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attempted secessions include the so-called "frozen conflicts" in Georgia,
involving two break-away provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, in
addition to the recent secession attempt of Scotland from Great Britain
through a popular referendum.6 Other more remote attempted secessions
7
involve Republika Srpska and Northern Cyprus, as well as Quebec.
On February 17, 2008, the Kosovar Parliament unilaterally declared
independence from Serbia.8 The declaration of independence had followed
a lengthy conflict first in the former Yugoslavia, and later against Serbia,
Kosovo's ruler.9 Within a few days, Kosovo was recognized as a new state
by the United States, as well as by many other powerful western nations.10
While Kosovo is still not a member of the United Nations (it has not
applied yet, in light of the probable veto by Russia and/or China) and while
many nations have yet to recognize it as a new state, its secession from
Serbia is afait accompli. 11 To date, Kosovo has been recognized by 110
states; twenty-three out of twenty-eight European Union states have
recognized its independence; those who have not include Spain, Greece,
Romania, Slovakia, and Cyprus.' 2 Kosovo is a member of several
BANGLADESH (University of California Press 1990), for a discussion of the Bangladeshi secession from
Pakistan.
6.
See Dan Bilefsky, Kosovo Declares Its Independence From Serbia, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18,
=
2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/18/world/europe/18kosovo.html?pagewanted
all& r-0 (last visited Jan. 16, 2015).
See generally Louise Arbour, Self-Determination and Conflict Resolution: From Kosovo
7.
to Sudan, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (Sep. 22, 2010), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/
publication-type/speeches/2010/Louise-Arbour-self-determination-and-conflict-resolution-from-kosovoto-sudan.aspx (last visited Jan. 29, 2015).
8.
Bilefsky, supra note 6 (noting both that Kosovar Parliament unilaterally declared
independence from Serbia on February 17, 2008, and that major world powers, such as the United
States, Great Britain, Germany, and France, were expected to recognize Kosovo as an independent state
within days).
9.

See STERIO, supra note 2, at 116-26, for a discussion of Kosovo.

10.
Who Recognized Kosova as an Independent State?, Kosovo THANKS You (Jan. 16,
2015), available at http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) (noting that 110
countries have recognized Kosovo as an independent state; noting also that the United States, the United
Kingdom and France recognized Kosovo as an independent state on February 18, 2008, one day after its
unilateral declaration of independence, that Germany recognized Kosovo's independence on February
20, 2008, three days after its unilateral declaration of independence).
11.
See Ivana Sekularac, Kosovo pitches peace treaty, recognition to old master Serbia,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/23/us-serbia-kosovo-visit23,
2014),
(Oct.
REUTERS
idUSKCNOIC1B220141023 (last visited Jan. 22, 2015) (noting that Russia, Serbia's long-time alley, has
blocked Kosovo's potential United Nations' membership through its veto power within the Security
Council) (observing also that Kosovar foreign minister, Enver Hoxhaj, recently visited Serbia to
negotiate a peace treaty whereby Serbia would also recognize Kosovo's independence).
12.

See generally Who Recognized Kosova as an Independent State?, supra note 10.
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Monetary Fund, the
international organizations, including the International
13
World Bank, and the International Bar Association.
In 2011, South Sudan seceded from Sudan. 4 The secession followed
decades of civil wars and violence within Sudan, and was orchestrated
through peace negotiations and a public referendum. 1" The people of South
Sudan overwhelmingly voted in favor of independence and pursuant to such
referendum results, South Sudan became a new independent state on July 9,
2011.16 Following its declared independence, South Sudan has been
recognized by the majority of states and has become a member of the
United Nations.' 7
In February 2014, Russian troops occupied the Crimean peninsula,
which had, until then, been part of Ukrainian territory.' 8 The Crimean
Parliament organized a referendum in May 2014, the result of which
proclaimed that Crimea would secede from Ukraine in order to join
Russia.' 9 The move was condemned by many as an illegal exercise of
Russian military power and an illegitimate land grab by the Kremlin, but
factually speaking, Crimea seceded from Ukraine.20 A total of five states
have recognized the new "status" of Crimea as forming a part of Russian

Organizations that have admitted Kosovo, Kosovo THANKS You (Jan. 22, 2015),
13.
available at http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/organizations (last visited Jan. 22, 2015).
14.

STERIO, supranote 2, at 161.

15.

Id. at 164.

Jon Lee Anderson, A History of Violence, THE NEW YORKER (July 23, 2012), available at
16.
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/07/23/a-history-of-violence-4 (last visited Jan. 22, 2015).
South Sudan was introduced as a new member of the United Nations on July 14, 2011.
17.
See UN Welcomes South Sudan as 193rd Member State, UN NEWS CENTRE (July 14, 2011), availableat
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD-39034#.VFKEhWdx9A (last visited Jan. 22, 2015);
INFO,
SUDAN
SOUTH
Sudan,
South
of
Relations
Foreign
see
also
http://www.southsudaninfo.com/ForeignRelations of SouthSudan (last visited Jan. 20, 2015).
Foreign Relations of South Sudan, supra note 17. See also Ukraine Crisis: 'Russians'
18.
Occupy Crimea Airports, BBC.COM (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe26379722 (last visited Jan. 22, 2015). It should be noted that Crimea, until 1954, formed part of Russia,
within the former Soviet Union; in 1954, Crimea was transferred to Ukraine.
19.
Crimea Referendum: Voters 'Back Russia Union, BBC NEWS (Mar. 16, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26606097 (last visited Jan. 22, 2015) (reporting that 95.5% of
voters were in favor of Crimea joining Russia, but that many Ukrainian voters boycotted the
referendum).
Id. (noting that the European Union and the United States condemned the referendum as
20.
illegal); see also David Adesnik, How Russia Rigged Crimean Referendum, FORBES (Mar. 18, 2014),
at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidadesnik/2014/03/18/how-russia-rigged-crimeanavailable
referendum/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2015) (arguing that Russian leader, Vladimir Putin, has both rigged the
referendum and abused and intimidated the Crimean population).
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territory, including Russia itself, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Syria, and
Venezuela. 2'
In August 2008, war broke out in Georgia, the former Soviet republic,
when Russian troops entered the territory of two break-away provinces,
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, to "protect" them from Georgia.22 These
provinces function de facto independently from Georgia, and the Georgian
central government has no effective control over their territory. 3 Over the
recent years, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have become Russian puppet
states-supported and almost entirely controlled by Moscow. While these
provinces have not been recognized as sovereign states by most countries
around the world (the few countries which have recognized them include
Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru), they have defacto seceded from
Georgia.24
In September 2014, the people of Scotland voted in a public
referendum on the issue of whether Scotland should become an independent
nation. 25 Had the vote resulted in a "yay," Scotland would have likely
seceded from Great Britain (British Prime Minister, David Cameron, had
pledged to respect any results of the referendum).2 6 Many will remember
that a similar situation played out in Canada in 1995, when the Quebecois
voted in a referendum on the issue of whether to secede from Canada; the

21.
Matthew Rosenberg, Breaking with the West, Afghan Leader Supports Russia 's
Annexation of Crimea, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/24/
world/asia/breaking-with-the-west-afghan-leader-supports-russias-annexation-of-crimea.htm
(last
visited Jan. 22, 2015); Interfax-Ukraine, NicaraguaRecognizes Crimea as part of Russia, KYivPOST
(Mar. 27, 2014), availableat http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/nicaragua-recognizes-crimea-aspart-of-russia-341102.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2015).
22.
See Will Englund, Comparing the Crimea conflict with the Georgia-Russiasituation of
2008, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2014), availableat http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/crimeacrisis-may-seem-like-georgia-russia-situation-of-2008-but-its-really-not/2014/3/2/39db 890-a2421le3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2015). Georgia had used force in South
Ossetia first, and Russia used this move as justification for its use of military force in both South Ossetia
and Abkhazia.
23.

Id.

24.
See Gerard Toll & John O'Loughlin, How People in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and
Trasnistira feel about annexation by Russia, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2014), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/20/how-people-in-south-ossetiaabkhazia-and-transnistria-feel-about-annexation-by-russia/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2015).
25.
Scottish referendum: Scotland votes 'No' to independence, BBC NEWS (Sept. 19, 2014),
available at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-29270441 (last visited Jan. 22, 2015).
26.

Id.
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secession proposal was defeated by an incredibly narrow margin. 27 Shortly
after the Scottish independence referendum, the Catalans, relying on the
Scottish precedent, announced that they would also hold a referendum, to
ask the Catalan people whether they wanted to secede from Spain. 28 The
Spanish government rejected the referendum idea, arguing that it would be
unconstitutional, and the Spanish Constitutional Court backed the
government. 29 The Catalans have thus far not been able to secede from
Spain, but it is reasonable to assume that they will continue their
secessionist efforts in the near future.
Going back in history, one can find other examples of de facto
secessions: situations where a secessionist entity successfully orchestrates
a separation from its mother state, but where the international community,
typically for a variety of geo-political reasons, refuses to recognize the
seceded territory as a new sovereign nation. In 1974, Turkish forces
invaded northern Cyprus; this part of the island nation has essentially
functioned as a separate entity and over the years, has de facto seceded
from Cyprus.3" A similar situation exists in Republika Srprka, the Serbianpopulated part of Bosnia, which, although formally incorporated in the
territory of the Bosnian-Croat Federation, has functioned as a defacto state
since the 1990s and has de facto seceded from the Federation.3 Other de

27.
Gerald L. Gall, Quebec Referendum (1995), THE CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA (Aug. 21,
2013), available at http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/quebec-referendum-1995/ (last
visited Jan 22, 2015).
28.
Spain's constitutional court bans Catalonia's 'independence consultation' vote, RT.COM
(Nov. 4, 2014), http://rt.com/news/202099-independence-catalonia-referendum-vote/ (last visited Jan.
22, 2015).
29.

Id.

30.
Dan Bilefsky, For Crimea, Secession Is Only as Good as Recognition, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
15, 2014), availableat http://www.nytimes.com/20l4/03/l 6/world/europe/for-crimea-secession-is-onlyas-good-as-recognition.html (last visited Jan 22, 2015)
In 1983, after Turks in northern Cyprus declared independence from Cyprus and
created the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the Security Council passed
two resolutions calling the declaration illegal, and requesting that no other states
should recognize it. That effectively isolated the north and deprived it of
international legitimacy, as well as much-needed foreign investment. To this day,
Turkey remains the only country to have recognized Northern Cyprus.
31.
Petr Bohacek, Is Republika Srpska About to be the Next Crimes?, VICE (Mar. 26, 2014),
http://www.vice.com/en-uk/read/secession-serbia-bosnia-hrzegovina (last visited Jan. 22, 2015) (noting
that the Bosnian Federation and Republika Srpska 'have independent constitutions, laws, parliaments,
borders, police forces, postal systems and even foreign policy' and that '[t]he Bosnian political system is
completely decentralised - divided into two independent entities.').
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facto states include so-called "frozen conflicts" of the Post-Soviet Union,
32
including Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnitria.
In sum, multiple de facto secessions and attempted secessions, have
occurred in recent history. Most of such secessions occurred outside of the
decolonization paradigm. As it will be discussed below, international law
has proved inefficient and uncertain at resolving these secessionist conflicts
because it does not embrace the possibility of secession outside of the
decolonization, and perhaps occupation, paradigms.
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW ON SECESSION

International law is mostly neutral on the issue of secession. While
international law embraces the right to self-determination for all people,
and while this right can effectively translate into remedial secession,
international law positively allows for this outcome only in the case of
decolonization and, perhaps, occupation.33 Other than these two relatively
rare instances, international law does not affirmatively authorize groups to
seek secession.34 Secession inherently undermines the territorial integrity
of the mother state, and international law has for centuries espoused the
principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Embracing the right
of secession would jeopardize the above-mentioned principles and could, as
critics assert, potentially lead to global chaos caused by an incessant
redrawing of boundaries.35
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has on occasion discussed the
issue of secession. However, the ICJ has failed to develop a normative
framework on secession, as it will be demonstrated below.
In the East Timor case, Portugal, East Timor's last colonizer, sued
Australia, claiming that the latter did not have a legal right to enter into a
treaty with Indonesia over East Timorese natural resources, because
32.
Jeffrey Mankoff, Russia's Latest Land Grab, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (May/June 2014),
available at http://www.foreignaffairs.comiarticles/141210/j effrey-mankoff/russias-latest-land-grab (last
visited Jan. 22, 2015) (noting the existence of four "frozen conflicts" in the former Soviet Union: South
Ossetia and Abkhazia (within Georgia), Transnitria (within Moldova) and Nagorno-Karabakh (disputed
between Azerbaijan and Armenia)).
33.

See STERIO, supra note 2, at 29.

34.
Id. at 12 ("[A]s of the early 1970s, the right to self-determination existed for all peoples,
but was limited in its scope with respect to non-colonized peoples, and was limited in its application to
colonized people ... ").
35.
See Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faco v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J.
20-26 (Dec. 22, 1986). This
view was expressed by the International Court of Justice in the Mali v. Burkina Faso case, where the
world court reaffirmed the uti possidetis principle (the respect of colonial borders and their elevation to
the status of international frontiers), recognizing its potential unfairness, but warning that a contrary
solution could lead to chaos and violence.
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Portugal was the true sovereign of East Timor, whereas Indonesia had
illegally occupied East Timor.36 The ICJ refused to resolve the dispute,
because this would have involved announcing a legal proclamation on the
status of East Timor (whether the people of East Timor had the right to selfdetermination, and which state was its legitimate "owner"), which at the
time was controlled by Indonesia. 37 The World Court dismissed the case,
by invoking the so-called indispensable third party doctrine, thereby
missing an opportunity to develop normative law on self-determination and
possibly secession.38
In the now infamous Kosovo case, the ICJ was asked for an advisory
opinion on the issue of whether the Kosovar unilateral declaration of
independence was in accordance with international law.39 The World Court
answered in the affirmative, but somewhat curiously or opportunistically
decided not to devote any significant space to the issue of selfdetermination and secession (it devoted only two paragraphs to these
issues).4" In its holding, the World Court stated:
[T]he Court is not required by the question it has been asked to
take a position on whether international law conferred a positive
entitlement on Kosovo unilaterally to declare its independence
or, afortiori, on whether international law generally confers an
entitlement on entities situated within a State unilaterally to break
4
away from it. '
Instead, the ICJ concluded that "[i]t follows that the task which the Court is
called upon to perform is to determine whether or not the declaration of
independence was adopted in violation of international law. ' 2 The ICJ
concluded that it was not, because international law does not prohibit
declarations of independence.4 3 It is interesting to note that the Security
Council had condemned unilateral declarations of independence in other
contexts-in Southern Rhodesia, Northern Cyprus, and Republika Srpskabecause, according to the ICJ, these declarations of independence had been
36.

See East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30).

37.

See STERIO, supra note 2, at 73-78, for a full discussion of the East Timor ICJ case.

38.

Id. at 78-86.

39.
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in
Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403 (July 22), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2015) [hereinafter Kosovo].
40.

See STERIO, supranote 2, at 78-86, for a full discussion of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion.

41.

Kosovo, supra note 39 (emphasis added).

42.

Id.

43.

Id. at 81.

2015]

Sterio

linked to some unlawful use of force by the independence-proclaiming
entity.' The ICJ distinguished all of the above situations from Kosovo,
where the Security Council had never taken the position that the Kosovar
declaration of independence was procured through an illegal use of force.45
Additionally, the ICJ addressed self-determination in the decolonization
paradigm in the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion, by determining whether
the people of Western Sahara, colonized by Spain and territorially claimed
by both Morocco and Mauritania, had a right to self-determination.4 6 The
World Court determined that the people of Western Sahara had a right to
self-determination, while refusing to rule on the legality of the Moroccan
and Mauritanian territorial claims to this region. 47 This advisory opinion is
significant because in it, the World Court implied:
[T]hat the principle of territorial integrity could prevail over selfdetermination, in instances where there is solid evidence of the
existence of a territorial claim over a particular region, despite
the fact that the people of that region do not want
to be governed
48
by the entity asserting such a territorial claim.
However, many have criticized the World Court judges for not pushing
their legal reasoning enough, in order to reconcile territoriality with selfdetermination.49
Finally, in the "Wall" case, the ICJ was requested to issue an advisory
opinion on the issue of what the legal consequences were arising out of
Israel's construction of a security fence or "wall" around the West Bank.5"
In this case, the ICJ reaffirmed the existence of self-determination rights for
the Palestinian people, citing its previous precedent and notably the East
Timor case, discussed above.51 The World Court determined that the Israeli
44.

Id.

45.

Id.

46.

Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16).

47.
Id.; see also STERIO, supra note 2, at 89-93, for a full discussion of the Western Sahara
Advisory Opinion.
48.

STERIO, supranote 2, at 91.

49.

See generally ANTONIO CASSESSE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL
218 (1995) (Antonio Cassese criticized the Advisory Opinion by arguing that it would
have been logical to hold a referendum for the people of Western Sahara, to determine whether they
preferred allegiance to Morocco or Mauritania); see also Thomas Franck, The Stealing of the Sahara,70
AM. J. INT'L L. 694 (1976) (Thomas Franck argued that the Sahara case was "monumentally
mishandled").
REAPPRAISAL

50.
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).
51.

Id. at 88.
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construction of the wall in its location was contrary to Israel's legal
obligations under international law, and that Israel was bound to respect the
Palestinians' right to self-determination.52 This case is significant because
the ICJ appears willing to proclaim its respect for the principle of selfdetermination outside of the decolonization paradigm.
The Wall case thus represents a legal proclamation by the world
court about the existence of the right to self-determination in the
non-colonial context. The opinion is tremendously significant as
it demonstrated the judges' willingness to develop a legal rule for
the first time (the existence of a non-colonial right of selfdetermination) .... 53

It should be noted, however, that the Palestinian case involves a situation of
occupation, which may be another recognized instance where the occupied
people are afforded the right to external self-determination through
remedial secession. It is unclear whether the ICJ would have been willing
to affirm the existence of the right of self-determination outside of the
decolonization and occupation paradigms.
This type of ambiguous attitude by international law vis-A-vis the right
of secession is unhelpful at best, and perhaps dangerous. It is unhelpful
because critics of secessions are able to point to the fact that international
law does not contain an affirmative right of secession, while secessionists
themselves can claim that international law does not explicitly prohibit
secession. Victory here may be in the eye of the beholder. It is dangerous
because it leads to inconsistent results, entirely dominated by politics.
Almost all secessionist entities which have been successful in their
separatist quests have been supported by at least one world super-power,
typically the United States or the Soviet Union/Russia. 4 Statehood in most
instances of attempted secession truly depends on whether the majority of
world countries, including the super-powers, are willing to recognize the
Almost all unsuccessful
seceding entity as a new sovereign state."
recognition. We all
such
garner
to
unable
been
have
entities
secessionist
know that recognition is a purely political act which arguably has little to
do with international law.56 We all know that world super-powers often
52.

Id. atT 122.

53.

STERIO, supranote 2, at 94.

54.

See generally STERIO, supranote 2.

Id. at 63 ("[S]upport by the great powers of a self-determination-seeking entity plays a
55.
dispositive role in secessionist matters.").
See William T. Worster, Law, Politics, and the Conception of the State in State
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play backyard political games at the expense of smaller, weaker nations,
including times when independence and/or secession is at stake. I argue
that this is a dangerous game, often leading to inconsistent results which do
not necessarily favor the interests of the relevant country and/or region.
lV. DEVELOPING A NORMATIVE INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK ON
SECESSION

We face two different options on the issue of secession. We can either
continue the present state of affairs by allowing international law to remain
neutral on secession and geo-politics, to determine outcomes of secessionist
struggles; or we can attempt to develop a normative international law
framework on secession, which could focus on several factors when
assessing the legitimacy of a separatist quest. The latter approach seems
preferable, because, as Harold Hongju Koh famously argued in the context
of a proposed humanitarian action in Syria, "lawyers are not potted
plants."57 It is our duty as lawyers to push for the development of new legal
norms, when such norms are necessary to fill gaps and to provide binding
guidelines to world leaders.
What would an international law framework on secession look like?
First, absent oppression by the mother state, only secessions undertaken
through a domestic constitutional framework, presumably with the consent
of the mother states, should be legal. This factor would "bless" the
proposed Quebecois and Scottish secessions, as well as the South Sudanese
secession, but would condemn the Georgian provinces' attempt at
secession, as well as Northern Cypriot and Bosnian Serbs' attempts at
statehood, as the latter have all involved the use of force and have been
conducted without the consent of the mother state. This rationale obviously
does not work in instances where the mother state is governed by a
dictatorship, does not have a democratic constitutional structure, and/or has
been oppressive toward the secessionist minority. In such instances, one
must look to other factors when evaluating the legality of a secessionist
claim. Here, one could look to the existence of so-called internal selfdetermination rights. In other words, has the mother state respected the
secessionist group's rights to some sort of autonomy, such as the political
right to form a provincial government, to be properly represented in the
central government of the mother state, as well as other linguistic, cultural,
ethnic, and religious rights (i.e., the right to have schools conducted in the
minority group's language, to have radio, television, and newspaper media
57.
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in the group's language, to freely practice its minority religion, to have
respect for various cultural practices, et cetera)? This was the argument
made pro-Kosovar independence, that the Serbian central government had
denied Kosovars the respect of any meaningful internal self-determination
and that
rights, that they had been oppressed by the Serbian government,
58
state.
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Second, any legal examination of secession has to look at the territorial
claims of the separatist group versus the same claim by the mother state.
Secession is always about territory and control of the land, and it is
unhelpful to look at it in the abstract. But how does one evaluate the
legitimacy of any territorial claim by any group? Lea Brilmayer wrote on
the subjects more than two decades ago; I believe that she was right and
would like to borrow from her.59 When evaluating the legitimacy of a
territorial claim by a secessionist group, one could look at the immediacy of
the claim, as well as how vocal the secessionist entity has been about its
claim. In other words, how long have the secessionists lived in the disputed
area-have they recently resettled there, or have they, consistently
throughout history, occupied the contested land? Have the secessionists
been loud and vocal about their claim for territorial independence-have
they consistently made this argument, throughout their existence within the
boundaries of their mother state? Additionally, when evaluating the
legitimacy of the secessionist territorial claim, one could look at the
composition of the local population, to determine whether the secessionist
ethnic group constitutes a significant majority. One could also look at this
pragmatically, and wonder whether borders can be easily redrawn to allow
the secessionist entity to form its own independent state, without
completely undermining the territorial layout of the mother state. Here is
where the Palestinian case for secession from Israel may run into trouble.
How does one unify Gaza and the West Bank without undermining Israeli
territorial stability?
Last but not least, any international law analysis of secession should
embrace a fairness element. Is it fair to block a secessionist entity from
exercising the right to form its own independent state? And, is it fair to
allow a secessionist group to secede, thereby altering the territorial borders
and stability of the mother state? The fairness element may be the most
difficult one to properly apply. What does fairness mean? And fairness by
whom? Fairness in international law, as in other contexts, connotes a
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reasonable and rational behavior by relevant actors producing overall
satisfactory outcomes from a neutral perspective. Fairness also implies a
procedural component that whatever change may be ultimately achieved is
produced through neutral and unbiased processes, such as, in this instance,
free and fair elections or public referenda. Fairness in the context of
international law may imply a consensus, by the majority of states, that the
result of a secessionist struggle was positive. This consensus may be best
reflected in United Nations General Assembly resolutions, where all states
vote on a neutral footing, as well as by decisions to admit, or not admit,
secessionist entities as sovereign partners into the United Nations.
I recognize that states are often driven by politics and their own
strategic interests in the global arena, and that looking at their practice does
not necessarily reflect their understanding of the law. Yet, states often
claim that their behavior is fully consistent with international law, and that,
if they chose not to recognize secessionist entity X, such non-recognition
was a result of some illegality by entity X. To the extent that international
law could develop to embrace a normative framework on secession, we
could expect to see that acts of recognition follow such a normative
framework closely, and that only those secessionist entities whose claims
are consistent with the proposed framework would be ultimately recognized
as sovereign states. The development of any new norm of international law
through custom, absent a treaty mechanism, is a circular endeavor. One
must determine that states are acting out of a sense of legal obligation while
one is trying to claim that such legal obligation already exists, because
states believe in it. Here, in the context of secession and recognition, one
runs into a similar circularity. Yet, I would argue that surmounting the
circularity is not impossible, as has been the case with many customary
norms of international law. It is possible to argue toward the development
of a new norm of customary law on secession, while examining various
states' behavior in world organizations and arguing that such behavior may
be due to the evolving customary norms on secession.
V. CONCLUSION
Harold Koh recently argued that international law should evolve and
adapt. "But why should the per se rule 'remain the law', particularly if it is
so manifestly outmoded, and tolerant of gross human rights abuse?"'
Within the context of secession, I argue that international law is "manifestly
outmoded," because it does not address secession outside the context of
decolonization or foreign occupation. Most secessions in the modem-day
era occur outside of these two paradigms, and it would be preferable to
60.
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develop an international law framework to apply to such secessions, instead
of letting politics dominate and determine secessionist outcomes.

